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Ireland and Afghanistan compared: Britain’s neutral neighbours in the Second World 
War 
 
This paper explores the experience between 1939 and 1945 of two neutral states which on 
the face of it had in common only one notable achievement: the fact that they each managed 
to stay out of Britain’s war despite sharing land borders with her or her possessions, and 
despite considerable diplomatic and economic pressure from more than one of the major 
belligerents – in Ireland’s case Britain and the United States, in Afghanistan’s Britain and 
(after June 1941) the Soviet Union. 
  In recent years the experience of European neutrals has received some comparative 
attention, in particular through the collection of essays edited by Neville Wylie,  European 
neutrals and non-belligerents in the Second World War, and through Christian Leitz’s study of  
relations between European neutrals and belligerents (a book which does not discuss Ireland 
at all). Such comparative work has complemented national studies of neutral states, such as 
William Carlgren on Sweden, Robert Fisk on Ireland, and Neville Wylie on Switzerland.
1 
There is an obvious geopolitical logic to studying European neutrals as a comparative group, 
even though the different states faced very different challenges and had very varied 
experiences depending on location, history, ideology and opportunity. But why pair Ireland 
and Afghanistan, and then for good measure bring in both Persia and Iraq into the 
discussion? 
 The first reason is the straightforward one that contiguity and patterns of migration greatly 
influenced the two relatively newly recognized states in their relations with their powerful 
neighbours. Each had highly permeable land borders, Afghanistan with British India, Ireland 
with the United Kingdom. Afghanistan’s frontier with British India was a theoretical legal 
construct, largely ignored by the people whose customary territories, ways of life and kith 
and kin spanned the Durand line effectively imposed by the British in 1893.
2 Ireland’s border 
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with Northern Ireland was equally porous. In addition, since independence Ireland and the 
United Kingdom had shared a common travel area, and Ireland was an important manpower 
reservoir both for British industry and for the British armed services. Many people and 
groups in both Ireland and Afghanistan regarded their legal borders as unilateral British 
impositions which cut them off from territory and people who rightfully belonged with 
them. Irish nationalists regarded the six counties of Northern Ireland as a lost province 
which should some day be recovered, while the Durand line divided historic tribal areas and 
peoples, and ensured that Afghanistan was entirely landlocked whereas Afghans aspired to 
control Baluchistan and through it access to the Arabian sea. 
 A second reason which justifies a comparative approach is a political one: independent 
Ireland and Afghanistan had respectively asserted their independence from British control or 
successfully maintained it through the use of force. Here there is also a coincidence of dates, 
as 1919 was both the first year of the Irish War of Independence, and the year of the third 
Afghan war (which ended with a ceasefire followed by an agreement signed at Rawalpindi 
which acknowledged Afghan independence beyond the Khyber Pass). Britain finally fully 
recognized Afghanistan as an independent state in November 1921, just a month before the 
Anglo-Irish treaty granted Irish independence.    
 A third reason is that during the war, in respect both of Afghanistan and of Ireland, 
Germany let it be understood that the certain reward for helping to defeat Britain would be 
the achievement of historic territorial ambitions (just as, in 1917, she had attempted to lure 
Mexico into the war with the promise of the restoration to her of lands lost to the United 
States in the nineteenth century).
3  
 A fourth reason for looking at the experiences of the two neutral states in wartime is that 
they each had to deal with what appeared a real threat of invasion from one or more of the 
belligerents in the early years of the war. Both Ireland and Afghanistan had to balance their 
determination to maintain diplomatic relations with the Axis powers, in their eyes a badge of 
sovereignty, with the necessity of preventing their territories being used to mount espionage, 
sabotage and subversive operations respectively against the United Kingdom and British 
India. Both states found that their most constant difficulties in remaining neutral and 
maintaining their sovereignty came from Britain. In the case of Afghanistan these pressures 
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were added to after 22 June 1941 by the Soviet Union, which was anxious about the security 
threat to its southern border posed by émigré groups in Afghanistan, and which rightly 
feared that the Axis legations in Kabul were up to no good; in the case of Ireland, after Pearl 
Harbor the United States played a somewhat similar role, adopting a pose of outright 
hostility to Irish neutrality and to the presence of Axis missions in Dublin which was 
somewhat at odds with the more nuanced approach developed in London where, for a 
variety of reasons, officials argued the need to persuade the Irish rather than to confront 
them. So carefully calibrated did British policy towards Ireland become, particularly in the 
crucial area of the security of war information, that the British security service (MI5) 
concluded that on balance Irish neutrality probably served Allied interests better than 
participation on Britain’s side in the war would have done.
4   
 A final reason for studying the two countries in parallel are the somewhat unlikely personal 
links which emerge. The appointments of the German ministers Hempel and Pilger, who 
were to serve in Dublin and Kabul respectively throughout the Second World War, were  
announced on the same day in Berlin in 1937: the British ambassador reported that Pilger  
does not give the impression of any particular ability and he has a somewhat scrubby 
and unprepossessing appearance, but he has always shown himself friendly to this 
Embassy in the transaction of the tiresome business which falls to the lot of a Near 
Eastern expert.  Despite the promotion involved he views his translation to Kabul 
without enthusiasm.
5
Pilger’s gloomy response to his elevation was well judged. Hempel was to sit out the war in 
Ireland unharmed, and at its end to be treated with great consideration by the Irish, despite 
British and American pressure for him and his staff to be quickly handed over to Allied 
custody. In the same year, the British decided not to oppose Soviet demands that Pilger and 
his staff be handed over to them for interrogation in Russia. When the Afghan government 
politely enquired in the spring of 1946 if Pilger had reached Germany, the Foreign Office 
thought it wisest ‘not to provoke’ the Russians, who had already refused to answer similar 
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queries from both Britain and the United States.
6 The minister never got back to Germany, 
and his fate is unknown but can be guessed: in any case he might not have had much to 
return to, as his home had been destroyed in 1943.
7  
 We may note other bureaucratic coincidences which reflect the intersecting nature of Irish 
engagement with the British empire. The British minister in Kabul from 1941 to 1943 was 
Sir Francis Wylie, an Irishman and a graduate of Trinity College Dublin. Like Hempel in the 
German legation in Dublin, Wylie was very concerned lest any clandestine activities run 
from the British legation in Kabul might compromise him in the eyes of the Afghan 
government. He consequently obstructed intelligence gathering by legation staff. This was 
somewhat to the irritation of Philip Vickery, the head of Indian Political Intelligence (IPI), a 
small London based organization which acted as a clearing house for all intelligence 
pertaining to India and to Indians. When he originally accepted the IPI post in 1926 
Vickery’s acceptance was sent from ‘Carraig na Mara, Killiney’. A gifted linguist and Trinity 
graduate, he succeeded yet another Trinity man, the Calcutta police officer Sir Charles 
Tegart. Finally, we may note that during the Second World War, one of the two Delhi 
Intelligence Bureau (IB) officers who ran the crucial double agent Silver, the link between the 
Indian nationalist underground and the German legation in Kabul, was William Magan of 
Killyon House in County Meath.
8   
 The discussion which follows is based mainly on British and Indian government records, 
including those of the Government Code & Cipher School (GC&CS), the India Office, 
Indian Political Intelligence (IPI), the security service MI5, and the Special Operations 
Executive (SOE), together with the diaries of Leo Amery, secretary of state for India from 
1940 to 1945, and the papers of the Irish Department of Foreign Affairs. 
***** 
Long before the Soviet Union was established, Britain had regarded Afghanistan as a 
necessary buffer between her Indian possessions and Russia.  Whatever the reality and extent 
of Tsarist designs in the late 19
th and early 20
th century, mutual Anglo-Russian suspicion and 
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jealousy about Afghanistan was enduring (although the two powers did cooperate in the 
region during the First World War, jointly occupying parts of neighbouring Persia, and 
Russia would have had a strong postwar claim to have her interests there properly 
recognized, had the 1917 revolution not taken her out of her alliance with France and 
Britain). During the First World War, Germany had sent a military mission to Kabul. It was 
the first diplomatic contact between the two states. The German aim was to lure the 
Afghans into a pact to expel the British from India. The Niedermayer mission stayed in 
Kabul for seven months in 1915/16, leaving in May 1916 when it became clear that while 
apparently well disposed towards Germany and hostile and resentful towards the British in 
India, the Afghans would not commit themselves (it appears their main aim was to use the 
threat posed by the German mission to force Britain to recognize Afghan independence). 
One of the mission, Otto Walter von Hentig, a specialist in Islamic questions, was to feature 
once more in the Second World War (early in 1941 SOE was repeatedly told to kill him and 
his assistants in Syria, where he was en route to Kabul to replace Pilger as minister, an 
appointment which the Afghans refused to accept: ‘the high authorities were most 
disappointed’ at delay in doing so, but in fact he survived the war, publishing a memoir in 
the 1960s and visiting Afghanistan as a guest of the king in 1970).
9  
 The parallel with Ireland is not exact – Afghanistan was already effectively an independent 
state, although not formally recognized as such by Britain – but the German design derived 
from broadly the same principle as did their encouragement and support for the Irish 
rebellion of 1916, i.e. that any trouble that could be caused away from the main fronts 
distracted British attentions and sucked away military resources. In the Irish case the results 
were spectacular, particularly in political terms, although Germany seemed barely to notice 
this; in the case of Afghanistan, while the Niedermayer mission did not succeed in its 
primary aim, it ensured that Britain had to keep much stronger forces to guard India’s 
northwest frontier than she would otherwise have done.
10  
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 Both Ireland and Afghanistan experienced an influx of German professionals in the 
interwar years, such as medical specialists, engineers, teachers, accountants and others with 
technical qualifications. In neither case should this be seen as evidence of a conscious 
strategy of penetration for political purposes; rather, it reflected two main factors: a 
conscious desire in each state to reduce dependence on Britain for necessary technical 
expertise, and for the Germans a hope that new markets could be developed. Germany put 
rather more effort into her attempts to use expertise to build up economic and commercial 
links with Afghanistan than with Ireland, for reasons not of geopolitics but of location and 
of potential: Afghanistan was but the remotest of a group of Middle Eastern countries 
including Turkey, Persia and Iraq where Germany sought to revive prewar economic links 
and to develop new ones. Diplomatic relations were established in 1922, and in 1923 a 
German minister was accredited to Kabul. The governments of Weimar Germany were at 
pains not to antagonize the British, repeatedly emphasizing that their interest was solely in 
developing trade and economic links in the Middle East generally and intended no threat to 
British interests.
11 Britain remained somewhat antagonistic towards such penetration and 
nervous about German influence generally. This was illustrated in 1924 when Wilhelm 
Wassmuss, the former German consular official who had earned a reputation as a Middle 
Eastern irregular fighter during the war second only to T. E. Lawrence, sought British 
approval for his return to Bushire in Persia to recover his possessions. The India Office was 
acutely alarmed at the prospect, and even the German minister in Teheran ‘foresaw no good, 
and possible trouble for himself’, despite Wassmuss’s assurances to the British minister in 
Teheran: 'neither by acts nor by words I shall give utterance to anything unfriendly ... the 
unfortunate war between England and Germany during which I have only done my duty 
towards my country is a thing of the past'.
12 Britain was also concerned generally that the 
Soviet-German rapprochement of the mid-1920s might have implications for her colonial 
interests in the Middle East.  
 Anglo-Afghan relations improved during the 1930s, as Kabul grew more confident that 
Britain would not seek to interfere in Afghanistan’s affairs. Kabul sought to maintain 
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passable relations with the two great and menacing powers on her northern and southern 
frontiers, whilst at the same time developing as many links as possible with other states 
which might act as a counterbalance. Afghanistan joined the League of Nations at the same 
time as the Soviet Union in 1934, and appointed a minister in Rome. This led to some Italian 
involvement, including the provision of aircraft and trainers for the Afghan air force (which, 
confusingly, by 1939 also had British trainers and some Hawker Hind aircraft). 
13 Once 
Hitler came to power, the nature of German engagement with Afghanistan inevitably 
changed. The ‘resurgence of Germany .. with its imposing industrial potential and its strident 
militarism, was a particularly attractive factor’ for the Afghans, particularly as Hitler was 
perceived to be well disposed towards Muslim interests and identity.
14 As in Ireland, the 
German colony was put under a form of political control. Lufthansa established a regular 
Kabul/Berlin route in 1937, although this was suspended when war broke out, and the 
Organisation Todt oversaw major roads and public works programmes.
15 But Britain was 
more concerned at the apparent growth of Soviet influence, and the possibility of a Soviet 
attack on India through Afghanistan.
16 Afghanistan, herself concerned that the Soviets might 
attack, sought a British guarantee of her territorial integrity in 1938, but that was not 
forthcoming. With the outbreak of war, the British general staff speculated that Hitler might 
encourage the Soviet Union to strike for India. This idea had in fact gained currency in 
Berlin, where the military pondered a ‘joint Nazi-Soviet strategy against the British Empire in 
the Middle East and Asia’, using the ex-king Amanullah, a modernizer in exile in Europe 
since his ouster in 1929 by more conservative elements, as a figurehead leader in 
Afghanistan.
17
 Compared to these complexities, Ireland seemed in very secure circumstances on the eve of 
war. Britain and France stood between her and the only conceivable military threat, and the 
likelihood of being drawn into a general European war had greatly decreased in April 1938 
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when Britain relinquished her defence rights under the Anglo-Irish treaty of 1921 as part of a 
general settlement of economic, financial and political issues. The American minister in 
Dublin remarked that this ‘was an outstanding triumph and marks de Valera as the greatest 
Irish leader’, while de Valera was at pains to thank the American president Roosevelt for 
sending a message ‘at a critical moment in .. the negotiations’.
18 The grievance of partition 
aside, Ireland’s geostrategic position must have appeared enviable to other neutrals intent on 
staying out of imminent war.  
 Ireland did have some concerns, however, as war loomed. After the 1938 settlement, de 
Valera reiterated his long held view that Ireland could never allow herself to be used by 
foreign powers as a base from which to attack Britain.
19 Since the early 1920s, Ireland like 
Afghanistan had experienced a modest influx of Germans. The state’s vast hydroelectric 
scheme on the River Shannon was built by Siemens, while the drive for industrialization in 
the 1930s saw German specialists take senior positions in various state enterprises. After 
1933 members of the German community in Ireland had come under pressure to 
demonstrate their loyalty to Hitler through participation in organizations under Nazi party 
control. The political leader of the German community was an Austrian archeologist, Dr 
Adolf Mahr, director of the National Museum of Ireland. This minor penetration of 
Germans did not cause London or Dublin any great concern until 1937, when evidence 
emerged of some espionage involving German residents and the officers of a ship which 
plied regularly between Dublin and Hamburg. During the Munich crisis in the autumn of 
1938 the Irish signaled their concerns to the British government about possible German 
clandestine activities (although not about German contacts with the IRA, which were only 
uncovered in 1940). On the advice of MI5, a counterespionage section was established 
within Irish military intelligence, and from this small start developed what became a very 
close relationship with MI5, ‘the Dublin link’ as it is described in British records.
20
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 No comparable prewar security link was forged between India and Afghanistan, although it 
is clear that Delhi did have some sources inside the country: in January 1940 MI5’s Guy 
Liddell noted that ‘the War Office are thinking of taking over the Police Intelligence 




Reviewing the situation in Afghanistan since 1939, early in 1943 a British official wrote that  
from the first, the Afghans had a strong anti-British and anti-Soviet bias, and the 
Germans were easily able to put this fact to good profit.  Many Afghans, such as 
Governors and police officials in the provinces, and Cabinet Ministers and civil and 
military officials in government departments at Kabul render the Germans services 
of one sort and another from time to time; and many more preach the German 
propaganda gospel in the bazaars and elsewhere. Very few of the above can, 
however, properly be regarded as part of the regular espionage apparatus itself.
22
The same could not be said of Ireland where, small groups such as the eccentric ‘Irish 
Friends of Germany’ aside, public sentiment was firmly pro-neutral and the private 
sympathies of the majority of people were pro-ally (particularly after the summer of 1940). 
The imposition of a remarkably strict system of press censorship also had a dampening 
effect on the dissemination of propaganda by both Germany and Britain.
23
 The advent of war immediately brought into focus the problem of German civilians in both 
Ireland and Afghanistan. The Irish had a lucky break, because about fifty of the most active 
Nazis, including Dr Mahr, were attending a party function in Germany and had to remain in 
Europe. Shortly afterwards, Dublin arranged with MI5 for the safe conduct through Britain 
to the Netherlands of a further one hundred Germans including most of the remaining 
active Nazis. Both the British and the German governments thanked the Irish for their help. 
A few Germans also moved from Britain to Ireland just before war was declared, including 
one man later arrested as a German agent.
24 The main security difficulties which the Irish 
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faced during the war came not from German residents but from three interrelated problems. 
These were the activities of German agents sent to Ireland in 1940, 1941 and 1943 on 
various clandestine missions directed primarily against Britain. With one exception, these 
agents were detected and detained very quickly. The second problem was the IRA, which 
developed its prewar contacts with Germany and which appeared a potential fifth column 
should Germany decide to invade. Although the organization seemed a major threat in the 
summer of 1940 – London received wildly exaggerated accounts of its size and capacity - by 
June 1941 the Irish government had it firmly under control and it was clearly incapable of 
any sustained pro-German activity.
25 The third problem was the presence of Axis diplomatic 
missions. Of these, the Italian did little, and until 1943, when they attempted to set up links 
with the IRA which the Irish police soon uncovered, the two man Japanese consulate did 
even less.
26 The great worry was the German legation.  Here the Irish had both difficulties 
and advantages. The legation, its personnel and their associates were watched, but its 
communications with Berlin could not be read. Furthermore, while Germany was in the 
ascendant in 1940-1 the Irish had to tread very carefully: it was only in 1943 that the British 
learned through decoding hitherto unbreakable German messages that Dublin had adroitly 
resisted a German plan to fly in three additional staff from France in December 1940, 
supposedly civilians but in fact army personnel tasked to collect intelligence on bomb 
damage in Britain, despite very menacing pressure from Berlin.
27  Yet it was in this period 
that the Irish and the British separately determined that the German legation had a 
clandestine transmitter. This was to prove a problem second only to Irish neutrality itself in 
Anglo-Irish relations.  
 The position in Afghanistan was very different. Central government was extremely weak 
and power was divided amongst ministers with their own followings and tribal allegiances. 
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Whereas in Ireland there were only two groups on the margins which might attempt to act in 
the Axis interest – the IRA, and the vestiges of General O’Duffy’s crypto-Fascist Blueshirt 
movement – Afghanistan was home not only to a range of diverse ethnic groups and tribes 
but to large numbers of Muslim exiles from Turkestan, Uzbekistan and other Soviet 
territories. Amongst these might be found people who, for reasons of kinship, or religion, or 
ideology, or money, would be prepared to make trouble along Afghanistan’s Soviet and 
Indian borders (German propaganda played on Muslim sentiment, and was probably 
responsible for an outbreak of anti-Jewish feeling in Kabul in 1941, although Pilger later 
reported that the only Jews in Afghanistan were impoverished hucksters in the bazaars).
28 
With the Soviet Union neutral but in a benign relationship with Germany, the Afghans could 
not afford to antagonize either the Germans or the Russians by imposing special restrictions 
on their respective citizens and Afghan supporters. Early in 1940, nevertheless, the British 
minister was instructed to urge the Afghans to reduce the number of German residents 
because of ‘dangers of German-cum-Soviet intrigue’. He was to remind them ‘of the 
methods of treachery and intrigue, now commonly associated with the name of Quisling’: 
Two months earlier London had received intelligence that ‘a plot is being hatched in Berlin 
for a rising in favour of Amanullah in Afghanistan’.
29 There are clear parallels with the 
British warning to Ireland of 1 June 1940 that ‘an invasion is not only seriously planned and 
prepared with the help of the IRA, but is imminent’.
30 The Afghans did take some steps to 
hamper Axis contacts with tribes along the Indian frontier, as it was a fairly open secret by 
1940 that the Italians were paying a subsidy to the Fakir of Ipi in Waziristan to mount 
operations against British interests: in December 1940, in a cable decoded by the British, the 
Italian minister said the Fakir was carrying out ‘the usual attacks upon military posts and 
traffic .. The Fakir talks of 900 British soldiers killed, but this is certainly an exaggeration’. 
Even though the Fakir never delivered the widespread tribal revolt of which the Axis powers 
dreamed, he certainly tied down a lot of British forces: at one point 40,000 troops were said 
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to be involved trying to catch him.
31 Events took a dramatic turn in July 1940, when two 
recently arrived German armed civilians disguised in Afghan dress had a confused encounter 
with an Afghan patrol, resulting in one of the men being shot dead, and the other 
wounded.
32 It was an important demonstration of resolve by the Afghans, whether or not, as 
one writer suggests, Britain had played a secret hand in arranging it.
33  
 In the first years of the war Britain could decode Italian and Japanese diplomatic traffic to 
and from both Afghanistan and Ireland, but not German. The latter proved impenetrable 
until the start of 1943, when it was broken and given the cover name Pandora. In the case of 
Afghanistan, Pandora confirmed other intelligence showing that from early 1941 the 
German legation had taken over from the Italians as the mainspring of large scale espionage 
and subversion directed against India, the Soviet Union, and Persia; in the Irish case, it 
showed that Hempel, while not collecting war intelligence systematically, was increasingly 
willing to risk his mission if he obtained vital information relating to Allied plans to invade 
Europe. Britain’s inability to read German traffic until 1943 was partly compensated in 
respect of both Ireland and Afghanistan by material in Italian messages. In both neutral 
states the Germans had clandestine transmitters; in neither did the Italians, who had to rely 
entirely on the security of their codes as their messages traveled by cable. Decodes of cables 
between Rome and Dublin showed clearly that, other than passing on vague gossip gleaned 
from Irish people sympathetic to the Italian cause, the Italian mission in Dublin was not 
engaged in orchestrating espionage or subversion against British interests (whereas Italian 
diplomats were so involved in the Middle East and in parts of Asia), and that Dublin was not 
a significant listening post for Rome. The most significant Italian message which the British 
decoded was a cable from the Italian embassy in Washington to the Italian legation in 
Dublin of 28 December 1940. Although somewhat garbled, enough of this was decoded to 
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make out its meaning. It began: ‘- has obtained facilities for a connection by wireless 
telegraph with Dublin via Berlin’, and instructed the Italian minister to ask his German 
colleague if he could use this link for important communications.
34 This was the first clear 
evidence Britain obtained that the German mission in Dublin had a clandestine transmitter, a 
discovery which dominated Anglo-Irish security relations until the set was finally handed 
over to the Irish in December 1943.
35  
 Exchanges between Rome and Kabul yielded a great deal of material on the extensive 
intrigues of both the Italians and the Germans in Afghanistan and along the Indian frontier. 
They also threw light on Axis efforts to use Afghanistan as a base from which to collect 
intelligence and to promote subversion in the southern Soviet Union. After June 1941, the 
latter problem acquired new significance in London and Delhi, since the Soviet Union had 
become an ally where it had previously been seen as a major threat: in the immediate 
aftermath of the attack, the India secretary Leo Amery feared that the Germans might soon 
be in a position to ‘attack us via Persia and Iraq as well as to stir up the Afghans’.
36
 Two months after Barbarossa, it was decided to send a SOE representative to Kabul. This 
was W.R. Connor-Green, who ‘has made a long study of Russia and the language’.
37 Britain 
already had an intelligence officer in Afghanistan, Major Fletcher, an old Kabul hand who 
had returned to the Afghan capital as military attaché in July 1940 to establish an intelligence 
organization directed against Axis intrigue. After some debate, the British minister prevailed 
in his argument that it was better not to advise the Afghan government of ‘real reasons for 
this appointment. I do not think that they would object to us organizing counter [measures?] 
to German and Italian influence here but would be afraid of such measures exciting Russian 
suspicions’. Fletcher only lasted a year, attracting complaints from the Afghans about both 
his ‘personal foibles’ and his clandestine activities. The British refused to accede to Afghan 
requests to withdraw him, but privately acknowledged that he had some ‘disreputable 
friends’ and was believed to let young men drink alcohol in his home. The British minister 
complained that he had also made an indiscreet approach to the Soviet embassy shortly after 
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Barbarossa, although he had received permission and the Russians were receptive – ‘they 
have a good deal of information about Germans employed by the Afghan Government, 
[but] they know little of German activities generally as there is very little contact between 
Germans and Russians’. A face saving solution emerged when the British army in Persia 
issued an urgent call for a Persian speaking officer, which provided ‘a very useful 
opportunity of settling this unfortunate incident to the satisfaction of all parties’.
38 
Intelligence work was left thereafter solely to SOE’s Connor-Greene, who was assisted by a 
Pole and two Afghans employed by the legation. However, their activities were initially 
greatly hampered by the British minister’s disapproval of intelligence activities. Within a year 
SOE asked for Connor-Green’s withdrawal as he was unable to discharge his allotted duties 
because ‘he did not appear to hold the confidence’ of the minister. Wylie’s unsympathetic 
attitude arose from his fear that any intelligence activities might antagonize the Afghans – so 
cautious was he that, shortly after arriving in Kabul early in 1941, he had put an end to 
contact with the Italian commercial attaché who had ‘had secret dealings with us’.
39 Various 
plans of Connor-Green, including a ‘Northern Informant Scheme’ aimed at obtaining 
information on Soviet Turkestan, had to ‘be shelved in deference to the Minister’s view that 
even the smallest risk of being caught out by our [Soviet] allies would not be justified by the 
potential results’. In Afghanistan, SOE’s man outlasted his diplomatic critic. Wylie retired in 
the summer of 1943, though not before he had embarrassed Soviet intelligence by 
mentioning their cooperation with SOE in Kabul to the Soviet ambassador, who was 
unaware of it.
40 His successor H.C. Squire, like Connor-Green a Russian speaker, was less 
inclined to fret about intelligence activities. Connor-Green departed, to the plaudits even of 
the Delhi authorities, towards the end of 1944.
41  
There is some parallel here with circumstances in Ireland, where SOE’s agent Roddy Keith 
was withdrawn in June 1941 after only three months following bitter complaints from the 
secret intelligence service (SIS) and MI5 about the damage which he might do to Anglo-Irish 
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security relations.
42 The two agencies which forced SOE’s departure, however, did 
themselves operate in Ireland with the blessing of the British representative Sir John Maffey, 
who was kept informed of their activities generally and who, in May 1943, was even admitted 
to the ultra sensitive secret of Pandora.
43 Although the Irish penetrated SIS’s clandestine 
Irish operations, they did not close them down because these were directed primarily at 
investigating pro-Axis activities and were not a threat to the Irish state, and also because the 
British would certainly have started up again and the Irish might not have succeeded in 
penetrating such new networks as effectively as they had the existing ones.
44  
 In Kabul Connor-Green secured an early success, enlisting the secret help of one Vichy 
French diplomat in the summer of 1942. This man won over the French minister to the 
Allied cause, and, ‘acting in concert with the Minister, [contrived] to gain the confidence of 
one or more of the enemy Legations’. The result was that the British received ‘about a 
hundred items of information from the enemy’ over the following year.
45 This was very 
much in contrast to Dublin, where relations between the Vichy minister and the Axis 
legations were minimal, and where most French officials appear from British and Irish 
intelligence records to have done little beyond feuding.
46 Even the naval attaché Albertas, a 
diehard Petainiste in whose household SIS briefly managed to plant a French speaking maid in 
1941, lived a disappointingly prosaic life until his reluctant and much delayed return to 
France in the autumn of 1944.
47
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 The higher up the chain of command the question of the Axis presence in neutral states was 
considered, the more drastic were the remedies proposed. The first two years of the war had 
provided plenty of evidence of Hitler’s contempt for the neutrality of small European states; 
in 1941, Britain took her turn to show disdain for the niceties of international law and the 
principles of national sovereignty amongst the newly emerging states of the Middle East. 
Under the Anglo-Iraqi treaty of 1930 in which Britain recognized Iraqi independence, she 
had retained defence rights; in 1941 this enabled her to move Indian and other troops into 
the Basra region after decodes of Italian diplomatic traffic and other intelligence confirmed 
that a pro-Axis coup was planned. These forces were then employed to expel the nationalist 
leader Rashid Ali El Gailiani shortly after he seized power with Italian and German 
encouragement. As the Italian minister in Baghdad put it, after staging the coup Rashid Ali 
was ‘very much vexed by the fact that at this delicate moment .. we have as yet given him no 
reply about support by Axis air forces’, which in fact the Axis attempted only to a very 
limited extent (the imminent attack on the Soviet Union being of more significance to 
Hitler). Like the Grand Mufti of Jerusalem, who had settled in Baghdad after fleeing from 
Palestine and who was closely involved in Axis plans for Middle East subversion, Rashid Ali 
fled Iraq and sat out the rest of the war in Rome and Berlin. In exile he still impressed the 
Italian foreign minister as ‘a vivacious and resolute man, who has great influence upon his 
people’, but he was no longer in a position to influence affairs in the Middle East.
48 The 
British installed a compliant Iraqi administration which did exactly as it was told until the 
war ended.  
 The British success in Iraq appeared to vindicate a robust approach to awkward neutral 
powers. It was shortly followed by the attack on Vichy controlled Syria, where the German 
air force had been allowed to operate from a number of airfields. The next neutral for 
attention was Persia, which the British and their new Soviet allies jointly occupied on the 
largely specious grounds that Teheran had been dilatory in taking action to round up and 
expel Axis civilians who were regarded as a threat to British and Soviet interests. Whereas 
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the Iraq intervention was reasonably justified in that the main aim was to oust an Axis-
sponsored coup – the details of which had been known in advance to the British from 
decoded Italian cables in which Rome offered reassurance and promises of support – the 
stated reason for occupying Persia was little more than a pretext for an exercise in force 
majeure.
49 Within a year the Persian police were reported to be doing well in tracking down 
Axis agents, and the British minister indicated some sympathy for the prime minister’s 
argument that to hand over such prisoners directly to the British ‘would be damaging to 
prestige of Persian Government’, and various ploys were worked out to avoid any 
embarrassment. The British and Russians also made unilateral searches and arrests in their 
respective areas of occupation.
50 For the rest of the war both Persia and Iraq operated under 
the sufferance of the occupying powers, and the Soviets took their time in leaving Persia 
after the conflict had ended.  
 The success of these Middle Eastern interventions may well have influenced the British 
prime minister Winston Churchill in his increasingly robust approach to other neutrals.  
In September 1941 he directed that pressure be applied in Kabul to obtain the expulsion of 
Axis civilians. Such an approach was possible because the Soviet Union was now an ally. He 
personally overruled the reservations of Wylie about the wisdom of seeming to bully the 
Afghans in concert with the Russians, and although resented in Kabul the initiative produced 
results within weeks.
51 It is reasonable to wonder whether this precedent came into 
Churchill’s mind in 1943, when he began again to press the Dominions Office for strong 
action to force the hand of the Irish government on the issue of the Axis legations in 
Dublin.
52  
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 After the Italian surrender Quaroni, the Italian minister in Kabul, gave Connor-Green a 
lengthy though self-serving account of his activities. He particularly criticized the attitude 
taken by the British and the Soviets at the time of the discovery of the Tirazi plot. This 
scheme was eerily reminiscent of the centerpiece of John Buchan’s First World War 
adventure Greenmantle. Devised with Axis encouragement by Bokharan and Uzbek exiles in 
India and northern Afghanistan, the plan was that 10,000 horseman would sweep across the 
Soviet border to coincide with a German breakthrough in the Caucausus, and make for 
Bokhara and Tashkent. Discovery of the scheme left the German legation in a ‘peculiarly 
delicate’ situation which might have led to its closure.
53 Quaroni, who claimed to have 
warned his German colleagues that the scheme was ‘not only dangerous but futile’, said that 
in this crisis both he and the German minister Pilger found that  
our greatest ally in this matter was Sir Francis Wylie.  The terms and method of the 
Joint Demarche with the Soviets so angered the Afghan Government as almost to 
neutralize their fury against the Germans. You will forgive me if I say that in this 
affair you made a great mistake in not taking into account the touchiness of the 
Afghans on the question of their independence.
54   
Wylie’s report of his meeting with the Afghan prime minister Zahir Shah bears out the 
impression of Afghan resentment: ‘Tone of conversation was unfriendly but Prime Minister 
controlled his temper – sometimes apparently with difficulty – and attempted no fireworks 
… After this interview I am strongly reinforced in my previous view viz that it was high time 
that Government here was pulled up short. Whether it is (? their) hatred of Russians – and 
indeed of ourselves – or whatever cause may be, their present relations with Axis seem to me 
to constitute real danger to Allied cause in this part of the world’.
55 Extraordinarily, this 
confrontation in Kabul caused an Anglo-American row: on 7 June an American diplomat in 
London told the Foreign Office that ‘any show of compulsion by the British and the 
Russians throughout Afghanistan that any benefits which might otherwise accrue would be 
outweighed’. If the Afghan authorities took all the action demanded, ‘the very stability of the 
present regime might be endangered by the resultant resentment amongst the tribes’. 
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Coming from an ally with little experience of and no strategic interest in Afghanistan, this 
produced near apoplexy in the Foreign Office. The foreign secretary sent Washington a stiff 
aide memoire on the issue emphasizing that the United States had no right of prior 
consultation on matters relating to Afghanistan. In Kabul Wylie taxed his American opposite 
number with furnishing an ‘exquisitely wrong’ picture of affairs.
56   
 In July further Anglo-Soviet pressure for a general round up of Afghan conspirators and 
émigrés was applied. The Soviet government, ‘while acknowledging the efforts taken .. for 
suppressing the harmful activities of white-emigrés, considers such measures inadequate’, 
and the ambassador provided a list of alleged subversives for detention. Wylie made similar 
representations a few days later.
57 Such concerted pressure might have backfired, but in fact 
it achieved its main objects. The Afghans asked for the withdrawal of two German officials 
mainly involved in espionage, and one Italian. To avoid loss of face, the Germans and 
Italians treated these as recalls. The Afghans secured safe passage for the Germans from the 
British, who were delighted to facilitate their departure, and they reached Germany safely.
58    
 The parallel between the Kabul representations and the ‘American note’ delivered in Dublin 
in February 1944 is obvious, although the roles of the Allied states involved were reversed. 
The American note was a clumsy attempt by the United States government to force de 
Valera to close the Axis legations or to risk having Ireland portrayed as indifferent to the 
security of Overlord, the imminent Allied invasion of Europe.
59 The Americans were egged 
on by Churchill, despite the ‘great misgivings’ of MI5 officers who feared the demarche 
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would jeopardize Anglo-Irish security cooperation just as preparations for Overlord came to 
fruition, and despite the war cabinet’s conclusions that Allied security interests were best met 
by leaving the legations in place, because their communications were completely controlled. 
The American note met with a furious reaction from Dublin, who saw it as a threat to 
sovereignty and which feared that it might be the preamble to armed occupation, as had 
happened in somewhat similar circumstances in Persia in 1941. British officials privately 
conveyed to the Irish the point that the impetus for the demarche had come from the 
American minister in Dublin, an indiscreet alarmist who had been told almost nothing of the 
workings of Anglo-Irish security cooperation since 1940. Controls on communications and 
movement between Ireland and the outside world were tightened up further by agreement, 
and security cooperation was not jeopardized. But Ireland maintained its diplomatic links 
with the remaining Axis powers until the end of the war.
60    
  The issue of the Axis missions in Dublin and Kabul threw up another commonality. Even 
when the pressure on the Irish and the Afghans to close them was at its most intense in 1943 
and 1944, intelligence officials in London and Delhi dealing with the question took a rather 
different view. This was for three main reasons. Firstly, all cable traffic to and from Kabul, 
and to and from Dublin, was routinely delayed by a number of days as a standard security 
measure. Furthermore, from 1943 all the communications of these missions could be 
decoded. In Dublin, the problem of the uncontrolled radio link with Berlin was solved in 
December 1943 when the German minister handed over his set to the Irish. In Kabul the 
German legation retained its clandestine set, but the enforced departures of the staff most 
involved in espionage and the exposure of German intrigues meant that Pilger and his 
remaining staff were in no position to continue subversive activities or to send intelligence. 
Pilger instead handed over the German networks in Afghanistan and India to his Japanese 
colleague. When in May 1944 the Soviets brought up the question of forcing the closure of 
the Japanese legation, Delhi told London that ‘Security and Intelligence officials here .. 
regard continued presence of Japanese Legation in Kabul as most desirable’.
61 This was 
because the Japanese were running the mercurial double agent ‘RK’, Bhaghat Ram Talwar, 
whose British codename was Silver. Silver was a committed communist, who at Soviet behest 
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had been working for the British since November 1942. He was the main link between the 
exiled Indian nationalist Subhas Chandra Bose and the nationalist underground in India, 
which also gathered intelligence for the Axis. Working under British control, from 1942 to 
1945 he systematically deceived both Bose and the Axis about the nature and extent of 
Indian resistance to British rule, and about Allied military dispositions and intentions.
62 Since 
the British were providing Silver with his material, and since they could read the relevant 
Japanese traffic, they had every incentive to let the Japanese mission in Kabul remain, and it 
did. Guy Liddell of MI5, who also dealt extensively with Ireland, remarked that ‘if there are 
no Jap embassies there will be no channels through which to pass deception .. we might 
therefore .. leave the one in Afghanistan which from the deception point of view was the 
most important since it controlled the Silver case’.
63     
 Dublin was never so significant a base for Axis espionage or for Allied deception as was 
Kabul, but officials in London argued on similar lines for keeping the enemy missions open. 
Their key arguments were firstly that the legations’ communications were under British 
control, thanks to codebreakers and to the cable system (all cables to and from Ireland were 
routed through London for the duration of the war); and secondly, that to bring about the 
expulsion of Axis diplomats might cause the enemy to send more agents ‘with means of 
communication which it would take some time to discover’, and who might obtain and radio 
back crucial war information.
64   
 
***** 
There are clear parallels in British diplomacy towards these two small and irritating neutral 
states with which she shared land borders during the Second World War. This is so 
particularly in terms of an initial tendency to underestimate the strength of national feeling 
and amour propre, and an unwillingness to comprehend the historical and political factors 
underpinning the reluctance of these neutrals to be forced to take sides in a conflict from 
which neither state could expect anything save certain pain and probable civil war. British 
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actions in the Middle East in 1941 demonstrated that she would openly violate other states’ 
neutrality where it suited her. The Anglo-Soviet occupation of Persia, in particular, must 
have sent a chill down Afghan spines. As well as the threat of a German attack in 1940-1, as  
preamble to or an element of an invasion of Britain, Ireland also faced the threat of such 
unilateral action by the British, particularly in the summer of 1940, and by American troops 
in Northern Ireland in the spring of 1944.  
 British management of relations with the two neutrals was characterized at the official level 
by a growing degree of appreciation of the factors influencing the responses of the 
respective governments to the diplomatic and security demands made of them. Calculations 
about the threats posed by the Axis diplomatic missions became increasingly complex as the 
war progressed, codebreaking improved, and opportunities were recognized for feeding the 
enemy disinformation through their diplomats. Such nuances were largely lost at the political 
level in London, where time and again Churchill attempted to short-circuit his officials and 
to bring matters to a head by threat, and if necessary by action.  
 Both of these very different neutral neighbours of Britain managed to stay out of the war 
despite the temptations of lost lands restored dangled by the Axis, and the pressures exerted 
by Britain and her allies. The Axis made an unconscious contribution to this outcome 
through the inadequacy of their codes, which revealed to the British both the extent and the 
limits of their clandestine activities in and intentions towards both Afghanistan and Ireland. 
But the major credit for the success of Irish and Afghan neutrality plainly lies with the two 
states themselves. Despite the geographic, cultural, political and historical differences which 
separated them, they had very similar dealings with the belligerents, and they successfully 
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